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Abstract 
The purpose of the thesis is to showcase the affect environmental policy has on the central-
local relations in contemporary China. The thesis argues that the central government is 
centralizing control of environmental policy by the use of the Prevention and Control of Air 
Pollution in Key Regions plan (Prevention Plan). The Prevention Plan introduces policies to 
enhance cooperation on a regional level to prevent and control air pollution and a more 
stringent control of infrastructure development in a select group of cities, so called city 
clusters. However, the plan does not address the implementation problems in terms of 
improving the ability of local governments to prevent and control air pollution themselves, 
rather the plan aims towards a more top down approach of implementation. The thesis will 
analyse the policies of the Prevention Plan through the use of the theory, de facto federalism. 
The theory will operationalize environmental policy into central-local relations and provide a 
framework in which the Prevention Plan can be understood. The thesis will also use 
secondary data to showcase the results of the policies in the Prevention Plan, therefore the 
methods used in the thesis are a case study longitudinal design to analyse the local 
governments included in the Prevention Plan.  
Key words: centralization, environmental policy, local government, central government, 
centre, China. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of Chinas rapid economic growth these past three decades, China has been 
experiencing increasing environmental problems, in fact the situation is so bad that China is 
ranked 128 out of 132 of the world‟s worse polluted countries according to the Yale´s 
environmental performance index of health impacts from air pollution. (Economy, 2014) 
Therefore, air pollution is one of the biggest challenges in contemporary Chinese politics. 
(Shao et. al., 2006)  
Every five years the State Council outlines a so called Five Year Plan (FYP) which sets the 
directives that the central government wants the local governments to fulfil with relevant 
supporting policies. The recent 12
th
 FYP has emphasised the improvement of air quality like 
no other FYP before it, which includes significantly revised laws and regulations to increase 
the authority of national and local environmental protection institutions as well as to increase 
accountability of local governments on environmental protection. One of the main sub-plans 
in the 12
th
 FYP is the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution in Key Regions Plan 
(Prevention Plan) which provides extensive environmental regulations to specific key regions 
that are especially polluted. However because of fragmented governance and weak rule of 
law, in combination with economic growth taking precedence over environmental protection, 
implementing environmental policy in the provinces is one of the great challenges towards 
effective environmental regulation. 
Since the main goal of the Prevention Plan is to prevent and control air pollution, the Plan 
introduces several measures and policies on how to do so, but the main features of the Plan 
involves controlling air pollution in specific key regions. As such, the Prevention Plan 
introduces policies to enhance regional cooperation and to classify certain city governments 
for more stringent requirements for air pollution control. The Plan tries to accomplish this 
through a top down approach, which means that local governments are accountable to set their 
own emission targets and to develop policies relevant to those goals. If city governments 
would fail to meet the air quality standards set by the Prevention Plan the local governments 
would lose some autonomy on environmental policy making in the future.  
The thesis argues that these measures are part of a goal by the central government to 
centralize environmental policy decision-making. Therefore the thesis will analyse the 
measures of the Prevention Plan, as well as to determine the success or failure of the 
Prevention Plan by the use of environmental information disclosure data from the Pollution 
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Transparency Index (PITI) to empirically prove its case. Since it is the responsibility of the 
local governments to provide this data to the local environmental protection institutions, the 
amount of data disclosed will reflect the effectiveness the Prevention Plan have had on local 
environmental protection, and therefore give us an idea of the possibility that the central 
government is centralizing power. Thus, the thesis is a case study with a longitudinal design 
to analyse the local governments included in the measures of the Prevention Plan between 
2011 and 2014.  
The thesis is divided into three parts. Firstly, the literature review will introduces the 
environmental challenges in contemporary China as well as an introduction to Chinese 
environmental governance. Secondly, the thesis will operationalize environmental policy in 
central-local relations theory and provide a framework in which the Prevention Plan can be 
understood. Thirdly, the data will be presented and analysed to conclude whether the 
Prevention Plan has been successful in preventing and controlling air pollution.  
1.1 Research problem 
Because local governments have autonomy on environmental policy making, the centre tries 
to control local government behaviour by evaluating the performance of the local officials. 
Therefore, for the central government to be able to implement environmental policies locally 
they need the cooperation of the local officials. The Prevention Plan includes several policies 
which need to be implemented locally but tries to avoid depending on local government 
compliance. However, according to the policies of the Prevention Plan, more stringent 
environmental regulations and regional cooperation is the main features of the Plan, (IGES 
policy report, No. 2013-02) which means that the Plan needs the compliance of the local 
officials to prevent and control air pollution.  
The problem is that the consequence of not meeting the air quality standards is not relevant to 
the local officials, meaning their performance evaluation is only marginally affected by poor 
environmental enforcement. In a hierarchical society as contemporary China, the heads of 
institutions control the general direction of the organisation, in this case the local government. 
Therefore because the Prevention Plan punishes the local government as an administrative 
unit and not the local officials running the local government, the thesis argues that the central 
government is aiming to centralize authority of local environmental policy. The thesis aims to 
prove this by analysing the result of the Prevention Plan, as well as its measures, in preventing 
and controlling air pollution. 
7 
 
1.2 Hypothesis 
The thesis hypothesises that; because the Prevention Plan does not incentives local officials to 
comply with the measures of the Prevention Plan, the central government uses the Plan to 
centralize authority of local environmental policy. 
1.3 Research question:  
1. How have environmental policy affected central-local relations in China? 
2. Why does the Prevention Plan ignore compliance of local officials in implementing 
environmental policy on the local government level?  
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3. Literature review 
Air pollution has been the most debated and well documented environmental pollution in 
contemporary China. For instance, coal accounts for 70% of the total energy consumption in 
2010 and emission from coal combustion are the major cause of air pollution in many regions 
in China. Furthermore, according to the World Bank, 16 out the worlds 20 cities with the 
worse air quality are located in China. (Chai et. al., 2014)  
The most heavily polluted areas in China is concentrated into so called city clusters, city 
clusters are areas where small towns have sprung up around larger cities. These kinds of 
metropolitan areas exist in other countries as well but Chinese clusters tend to be much more 
concentrated and densely populated. For instance, the distance between cities is often less 
than 10 km in the Pearl River Delta region. Furthermore these clusters often constitute the 
bulk of the economic growth in China which results in high concentration of energy 
consumption in a small area. For instance, although the Pearl River Delta only account for 
20% of the Guangdong province, 67% of the coal and 85% the oil consumed in the province 
is consumed in the Pearl River Delta city cluster. (Shao et. al., 2006) 
The first serious involvement by the Chinese government in environmental protection 
occurred during the late 1970s in the form of economic reforms. The Environmental 
Protection Law was enacted in 1979, revised in 1989 and 2014, as of 2007 China has 20 
environmental laws adopted and 140 executive regulations issued and a series of 
environmental standards at a national level. (Carter et al., 2007) 
However, despite these measures the implementation of environmental policy and the 
enforcement of environmental regulations is still one of the biggest problems towards 
effective environmental protection in contemporary China. That is why the thesis will discuss 
the reason behind the implementation gap and what measure the centre use to incentives local 
officials to comply with central directives on environmental regulations. However, before 
that, the basic concepts of Chinese government structure will be introduced. 
2.1 Government Structure  
In the Chinese government system there is a clear and strict hierarchy on what level of 
authority every level of government has over the other. However sometimes local government 
responsibilities are overlapping and therefore it is important to clearly define between the 
different levels of government and its institutions. 
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Contemporary China is divided into seven administrative units from the highest to lowest; 
provincial level, prefectural, county, township and village, including sub levels on prefectural 
and provincial level. However in contemporary China, cities have been included in the 
administrative hierarchy, the so called city governments have been given larger authority to 
impose independent economic decisions in the provinces they reside in. There are four 
administrative levels of a city government, county level city, prefectural level city, sub 
provincial level city and provincial level. Depending on which level in the hierarchy the city 
inhibits the more power the city has to affect their economic development and also that of 
their subordinate administrative units. (Shen, 2007) 
This means that there are two basic types of administrative units, one is the city type units and 
the other is area type units, for instance there is prefectural city unit and there are prefectural 
area unit (Ma, 2005). It is important to also note that for instance, a prefectural level city unit 
has much more administrative power than a prefectural area unit, which means that city 
governments is rather high in the administrative hierarchy. (Shen, 2007) 
Provincial level is the highest authority among the local governments, but has limited 
influence over city governments. The central government (which includes the Chinese 
Communist Party, National People´s Congress and the State Council) is the highest authority 
in the country but with separate responsibilities, the State Council has executive 
administrative power in China, while the NPC is Chinas main legislative body. However even 
though formal power remains in the hands of the State Council the Chinese Communist Party 
has ultimately the greatest political power in China. (Luo et al., 2008) However, prefectural 
level cities will be the main analytical unit in the thesis, because they are the main executive 
bodies for enforcing environmental policies. (Qi et al., 2014) 
To sum up, by local government the thesis refers to all the administrative levels under the 
central government including city governments unless the thesis explicitly refers to city 
governments. Because the prefectural level cities are the main executive body for enforcing 
environmental policy, city governments will refer to the prefectural level city units. When the 
thesis wants to refer to the central government, which includes the Chinese Communist Party, 
the State Council and the National People´s Congress, it will say the centre. 
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Source: Authors compilation 
Figure 1.1 Administrative Divisions 
Furthermore, laws and regulations have a very complex framework in China. According to the 
1982 constitution, the highest authority to enact basic laws, supervise the implementation of 
such laws and to make amendments to the constitution is the National People´s Congress. 
However despite the formal powers the National People´s Congress, the Chinese Communist 
Party has ultimately the greater power in contemporary China. Furthermore even though the 
National People´s Congress has the responsibility for all passage of national laws, other 
government authorities also has a wide range of law making powers. Alford et al. (2001) 
states that; “the State Council, Chinas chief administrative and executive body, is authorized 
to both enact administrative measures, rules, regulations and decisions pursuant to national 
laws and the constitution, and to submit legislative proposals to the National People´s 
Congress (Alford et al., 2001;708)”.  
On a provincial and local level of governments there is the People´s Congress which can 
provide a wide range of local regulations, including local governments and government 
departments, provided they do not violate the national laws and the constitution. 
Consequently national laws are decided by the National People´s Congress, however other 
policies on a national level such as regulations and standards are issued by the State Council 
and its ministries. (Alford et al., 2001; IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) 
11 
 
Before 2008 there existed two national environmental Protection institutions, State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP), which had overlapping responsibilities. However after the so called super ministry 
reforms in 2008, SEPA and MEP merged and became just MEP. Because of these reforms 
MEP was alleviated to super ministry status and received a cabinet level in the State Council. 
MEP therefore has the same authority as their economic counterparts, such as the Economic 
Commission and has direct authority to influence State Council decision making; “According 
to the Organic Law of the State Council Article 17, the State Council and its ministries at its 
cabinet level have the authority to decide major national economic and social development 
plans and the national budget (Qiu, 2008; 9)”. This means that MEP has the authority to 
influence economic decision making and thus be able to raise environmental concerns during 
development plans. (Qiu, 2008)  
 
2.2 Power Relations in China 
Since the Chinese government system is so hierarchical, it is impossible for lower level units 
to interact with the centre without going through the next step in the hierarchy. This 
administrative arrangement has not always been this way however. Prior to 1978 the Chinese 
political system was highly centralized, but since the early 1980s there has been a tendency 
towards decentralization. (Shen, 2007) According to Zheng (2007) the Chinese constitution 
stipulates that; 
(…) all provincial governments are local state administrative organs, they must accept the 
unified leadership by the State Council, implement administrative measures, regulations and 
decisions by the State Council, and be responsible and report to the State Council. (Zheng, 
2006; 103) 
Meaning, the centre has overwhelming power in the decision making of society. (Shen, 2007) 
The State Council has the authority to define specific functions and powers of local 
governments and it also has the authority to nullify any decisions or laws proposed by them. 
This means that even though provincial People‟s Congress (legislative branch of the 
provincial government) has the right to make local laws, the National People´s Congress 
(legislative branch of the centre) can annul them if they conflicts with national laws. (Zheng, 
2006) 
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On a practical level however local governments have more autonomy than what the Chinese 
constitution stipulates, when the centre want to implement policies they have to rely on local 
bureaucracies and governments to implement them, however local interests are not always the 
same as national interests. This means that instead of the central-local relations being one 
sided, power is actually divided between two actors. (Zheng, 2006) 
The central-local relations in China can be defined as the following; 
1. Intergovernmental decentralization is institutionalized to such a degree that it is 
increasingly becoming difficult, if not impossible, for the national government to 
unilaterally impose its discretion on the provinces and alter the distribution of the 
authority between governments. 
2. The provinces have primarily responsibility over the economy and, to some extent, 
politics within their jurisdiction.  
Source: Zheng, 2006; 107 
This means that local governments have control of economic development within their 
jurisdiction. When we speak of local autonomy in China there are certain limitations which 
local government have over the central government and vice versa. Some policy decisions are 
exclusively dictated by the local governments, which often concern economic matters, while 
some are dictated exclusively by the centre, such as foreign policy and national defence. 
(Zheng, 2006; Shen, 2007) 
During the decentralizing reforms of the 1980s, the Chinese government has been very 
successful in boosting economic growth. The notion is that decentralization is more effective 
for economic growth than in a centralized structure because individual preferences of 
economic goods differ, thus it is difficult for the centre to provide economic policies that 
adapts to the preferences of local residences among the different provinces. Hence 
centralization is unlikely to happen on economic matters, but the paradox is that economic 
growth is often correlated with reduced air quality, at least in newly industrialized countries 
such as China. (Zheng, 2006)  
Because the local governments have exclusive decision making rights on certain issues, the 
centre cannot directly control and enforce local environmental regulations. In fact, it is also 
stipulated by law that local governments have autonomy on environmental policy-making. 
According to the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPC Law) article 3; “the local 
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governments at various levels shall be responsible for the quality of the atmospheric 
environment under their own jurisdiction (…)”  
Therefore it is necessary for the centre to implement policies that will control the behaviour of 
local officials in order to make them enforce the environmental regulations. The next section 
will explore environmental policy on a street level and what measures the centre use to 
control the behaviour of the local officials.  
2.3 Local officials 
According to the Environmental Quality Administrative Leadership Accountability System 
that was passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 2006, the promotion and 
removal of local cadres (Local officials) has been directly linked to their environmental 
performance. According Hsu (2013); “Local leaders who fails to meet the targets for 
consecutive years is not eligible for promotion in the next five years (Hsu, 2013; 288)”. 
However because of the evaluation system, the impact of local cadres environmental 
performance is comparatively less than on for instance economic performance.  
According to interviews by Hsu (2013), many provincial and local officials did not feel that 
there was any real consequence of not achieving the environmental targets. Furthermore the 
degree of institutionalization at the provincial and local levels fluctuate considerably, for 
instance different provincial and local environmental protection institutions has different 
systems on how to assess the environmental performance on their respective local cadres. In 
most of them, environmental performance only included a small percentage of the total 
performance evaluation. There are also other hindrances to incentivise local cadres to engage 
themselves on environmental issues, which will be explained below. 
The following research is done by Eaton and Kostak (2014) which have collected empirical 
data from interviewing leading officials in Shanxi, Hunan and Shandong. In Eaton and Kostak 
(2014), the authors explain that cadres on county and municipal level (prefectural level) are 
rotated every five years, however more often than not the rotation are significantly shorter 
than that and to a lesser extent longer. Rotation often occurs in the context of promotion and 
much less frequently, demotion. Statistics show that since the 1990s the rotation of local 
officials has become more frequent, between 2002 and 2011 tenure length dropped to an 
average of 3.3 years from 4.2 years in the 1990s.  
According to Eaton and Kostak (2014), one of the reasons for the rotations system is to place 
limits on local cadres and to discourage them to engage in localism; “This Churning of local 
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leaders is largely a legacy of the Deng-era leadership‟s interest in strengthening the centre´s 
levers of control over the localities (Eaton; Kostak 2014; 362)”. The assumption is that if 
local leaders hold office in areas where they have no ties or origin and are frequently rotated, 
are less likely to favour local interests and to deviate from the goals set by the centre. 
Supposedly this system would also enhance monitoring since the new cadre would provide 
the central government with inside information on the predecessor´s reign.  
Furthermore, Eaton and Kostak (2014) argues that; “while control and monitoring constitute 
the core aims of the rotation system, relevant policy documents now more often link cadre 
circulation to the broader mandate of rejuvenating the cadre ranks and strengthening the 
state´s leadership capacity (…) (Eaton; Kostak 2014; 363)”. However even though new 
supplementary aims have been added over the years, it does not change the fact that the core 
aim of the system is to monitor and to control local officials and that the turnover has 
increased in recent years. This means that we can draw the conclusion that even though local 
governments have extensive autonomy during their time in office, the centre also makes 
extensive indirect efforts to make sure that the local and provincial governments comply with 
central directives. However, as we have seen the measures have not been effective and local 
governments still prioritises economic growth over environmental protection because of the 
unclear evaluation procedures. 
2.4 Environmental protests 
Despite of the current efforts by the centre on environmental protection, it is only in recent 
years that the centre has properly reacted to them. Economic growth has been and still is the 
main political discourse in China and has therefore taken precedence over environmental 
protection. Because of the severity of the degradation and the weakness of the rule of law in 
contemporary China, environmental grievances often lead to environmental protests.  
This lack of an effective institutional mechanism for the Chinese people to participate in the 
environmental policy-making process or to get redress through the legal system has 
translated into a vibrant environmental protest movement in China (Economy, 2014; 191) 
The impact on environmental protests is no more evident than in Deng and Yang (2013) 
study, where 11 pollution factories in 2005 were forced of their land by farmers. In fact; 
“environmental „Mass incidents‟ grew by an average of 29% annually from 1996 to 2011, and 
120% from 2010 to 2011 (Balme et al., 2014; 4).” 
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In other relevant literature, one can find that environmental policy advocacy also has had an 
impact on government policy, at least on a local level. For instance, after a mountain of 
discontent as a result of increased air pollution in Beijing in May 2013, the Beijing 
government introduced the so called, Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control, 
which is a comprehensive local plan to prevent and control air pollution. (Economy, 2014)  
In 2000 the central government passed the Law of the People´s Republic of China on the 
Prevention and control of air pollution (APPC Law). By studying the law, one can see 
similarities between the policies of the Prevention Plan and the articles of the law, in fact the 
thesis argue that this is the legal basis for the Prevention Plan. However, as the plan was 
implemented in 2012, there is a large interval between the passing of the law and the 
implementation of the plan. 
During my visit in Beijing at Beijing University, I had a professor which helped me by acquire 
all of my primary data. During our second meeting we came into discussion about this law 
and she took particular notice when I told her that I believed that the law was the legal basis 
for the Prevention Plan. She did not argue that this was not the case, rather she wanted to 
correct me about the word “legal basis”, this is a very western term she said, and explained 
to me that laws themselves does not have much substance in contemporary China. She argued 
that it is the political basis that gives substance to the enforcement of laws. The law was 
passed in 2000 and the plan was implemented in 2012, so why the large interval between the 
two? She argued that public pressure is the definitive reason for laws being planned into 
action. (Personal communication, 13 March 2015) 
In other words, the APPC Law was drafted out of necessity from public pressure, and after a 
decade of growing environmental protests, the APPC Law was ready to be enforced through 
the Prevention Plan. So what is the significance of the Prevention Plan?  
2.5 Prevention Plan 
Before introducing the policies of the Prevention Plan, it is necessary to explain what a Five 
Year Plan (FYP) is and how it is related to the Prevention Plan. 
The FYP is outlined every five years where ministries propose plans covering their related 
fields, within the FYP there are targets which central and local governments need to fulfil 
with relevant supporting policies. FYPs themselves are not laws, instead they provide 
guidance for government policies, and they sometimes establish a process to create new laws 
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and regulations or revise existing ones, but laws are also sometimes developed in conjunction 
with the FYP. (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) 
The reason that the thesis is not going into further details about the measures in the 12
th
 FYP 
is because it is beyond the scope of the thesis, because new plans is being developed 
throughout the FYP period. Old laws, regulations, policies and sub-plans are being 
incorporated and revised, so the distinction between FYPs measures can easily become 
blurred.  
One of the major sub-plans in the 12
th
 FYP is the Prevention Plan, which makes additional 
efforts to prevent and control air pollution in the key regions by having stricter requirements 
for cleaner technology, reduce coal consumption etc. The Prevention Plan is a milestone in air 
pollution control in China because it is the first time the central government issues a 
comprehensive air pollution prevention and control plan. The main feature of the Prevention 
Plan is that city governments within the same city clusters shall coordinate in controlling air 
pollution instead of solely focusing on their own jurisdictions. The areas covered in the plan 
only covers 14% of the total area in China, but it contributes 71% of the country‟s GDP and 
52% of the country‟s coal consummation, which makes these areas especially polluted. The 
fact that China is setting up strict limits on air pollution in these areas is significant because it 
indicates the willingness to sacrifice some growth for environmental protection. (CAAC 
policy briefing, 2012) 
Some examples of policies where the Key Regions have more stringent environmental policy 
than the other regions: 
1. Stricter environmental thresholds, strengthen management at the source 
2. Strict controls on high energy consumption and high pollution projects 
3. Strict control on new pollutant emissions 
4. Implementation of special emission limits 
Source: CAAC policy briefing 2012; 15-16 
The reason for the adoption of the Prevention Plan is that local governments work separately 
from each other, and there are no established institutions on a regional level to prevent and 
control air pollution. Furthermore, the current laws and regulations lack effective measures to 
prevent and control air pollution as well as mobile pollution sources on a regional level. 
(CAAC policy briefing, 2012) 
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The regional cooperation measures in the Prevention Plan is divided into two different 
approaches, the top down approach where four regions, Beijing-Taianjin-Hebei, Yangtze 
River Delta, Chengdu-Chongqing and Ganning (Gansu and Ningxia)  are to cooperate and 
establish working groups led by MEP, the bottom up approach entails that all the other 
administrative areas (Pearl River Delta, Central Liaoning province, Shandong province, 
Wuhan region, Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan, the West Bank of the Taiwan Strait, Gansu and 
Ningxia, Central and Northern part of Shanxi province, Central Shanxi province and Urumqi 
city cluster) should decide their own leadership. (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02)  
In the event that local governments fail to follow the environmental standards, MEP has been 
given the authority to supervise a time plan for better policy decisions. 
Municipalities which do not meet air quality standards will need to develop time limited plans 
to do so, and these should be open to the public. Compliance deadlines of municipalities 
directly under the central government should be approved by the State Council. Compliance 
deadlines for 113 national Key Environmental Protection Cities should be approved by the 
respective provincial governments and MEP, and the deadlines of other cities should be 
approved by their provincial governments and recorded by MEP. Implementation should be 
monitored by national and provincial environmental protection departments. (IGES policy 
report, No. 2013-02; 62) 
 
This indicates that if municipalities (Prefectural cities) do not meet the air quality standards, 
MEP will have greater authority to make sure that they comply, which will strengthen the 
centre´s position in the provinces in the long run. Furthermore, the emphasis on accountability 
rests on the local government as a whole, rather than on the local official in charge at the time. 
(IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) As we have seen in the literature so far, is that, the 
hierarchal structure makes the local official of the local government the only person that can 
set the general directives of its administration. This means that, to make local governments 
comply with the Prevention Plan, the local officials needs to be incentivised to do so. 
Nevertheless, according to the IGES policy report (2012); “many specific targets, policies and 
key projects are established to apply to both key regions and enterprises without the need for 
any voluntary cooperative measures among provinces and municipalities (IGES policy report, 
No. 2013-02; 63)”. This means that a lot of the policies and measures in the Prevention Plan 
increases the influence of the centre and favours a top down approach when handling 
environmental issues on a local level. 
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2.6 Policy Experimentation 
As the thesis has shown thus far, the decentralized system in contemporary China can result in 
problems of local implementation. However, decentralization also opens up possibilities for 
controlled policy experiments on a local level before being implemented nationally. 
(Economy, 2014) It is highly possible that the Prevention Plan is just an experiment, rather 
than a fully developed national plan. 
In the article Heilmann (2008) the author identifies a concept called experimental hierarchy, 
which stipulates that the Chinese government system makes it easier to test policies before it 
being finalized on a larger scale. According to Heilmann (2008) policy experimentation in 
China is not a mere trial and error process, the experiment is delegated from the centre and 
implemented by local officials which are then coordinated by the centre to generate; “(…) 
policy option that are injected into official policymaking and then replicated on a larger scale, 
or even formally incorporated into national law (Heilmann, 2008; 3)”. 
However, one could argue that the Prevention Plan is much too large in scale to be considered 
a controlled environment to which policy can be tested. Fortunately Heilmann (2008) 
provides us with examples of past policy experimentations by which we can compare the 
Prevention Plan with. There are three main approaches in policy experimentation in China; 
experimental regulation, experimental points, and experimental zones. The most applicable 
approach for this thesis is the experimental zones, experimental zones are; “(…) geographical 
units and jurisdictions that are provided by the central authorities with broad discretionary 
powers (Heilmann, 2008; 7)”. The Prevention Plan is by definition divided into geographical 
zones specifically aimed at preventing and controlling air pollution, therefore it is highly 
likely that the Plan is part of an experimental zone approach by the centre. An example of an 
experimental zone is the special economic zones, which were allowed to draft and to enact 
their own legislation. However, the difference between an experimental zone aimed at 
economic growth and the Prevention Plan cannot be overlook. For instance, the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) were allowed special freedoms in dealing with land auctions, 
wholly foreign-owned companies or labour market liberalization, which were restricted in the 
rest of China at the time. Thus the comparison becomes difficult because whereas the 
Prevention Plan aim to restrict policies developed in the key regions, the SEZ was aimed at 
allowing more freedoms in policy development. (Heilmann, 2008) 
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Special Economic Zones is therefore a case of decentralization, while the Prevention Plan is 
arguable a case of centralization, however, as discussed earlier in the thesis, the Plan has two 
approaches one is top down and the other is bottom up approach, which indicates that there is 
centralization as well as decentralization. Considering Chinas past tendency of policy 
experimentation it is possible that the Prevention Plan is just an experiment for larger reforms 
to come. One of the clues that may indicate experimentation, is the Prevention Plan was 
initiated by the centre and even though the bottom up regions are left to decide their own 
leadership, the standards and policies are still set by the centre (Heilmann 2008). 
However, the question is how much sponsorship and advocacy do these regions receive to 
formulate their policy? If the local governments do not receive support during the cooperation 
process then it may indeed prove that the Prevention Plan is full blown national policy and not 
an experiment. According to Heilmann (2008); “In a hierarchical system, bottom up 
experimentation goes nowhere without higher –level patrons or advocates (…) (Heilmann 
2008; 9)”. What can be found in the Prevention Plan is that involvement from the centre only 
occurs in the top down approach regions and even though there is regional management 
mechanism proposed, the responsibility of implementing them lays with the respective 
regional working groups, which is decided by themselves in the bottom up approach regions. 
However, the fact that there are different approaches may also be an indication that the centre 
is experimenting on which approach is more successful. Furthermore as Heilmann (2008) 
points out; “experimental policy tools continue to be used for pioneering reforms that belong 
to the top of the policy agenda (Heilmann, 2008; 9)”, which environmental policy surely is. 
Indeed, if the Prevention Plan can be considered a policy experiment, then it shows that there 
may be experimentation aimed at centralizing power as well as decentralizing it. However, 
Heilmann (2008) argues that because local governments are sometimes leaders of policy 
reforms as well as followers; “the entire policy process must be conceptualized as an 
oscillating multilevel interaction rather than as a dichotomized process of centralization vs. 
decentralization. (Heilmann, 2008; 5)”. Therefore the Prevention Plan may not be considered 
as to either centralize or decentralize but as a multilevel interaction between different levels of 
government and other stakeholders.  
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2.7 Pollution Information Transparency Index 
The thesis will analyse the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) data to 
empirically prove its case. The data will provide the thesis with the score and ranking of the 
sample of cities on their performance in environmental disclosure requirements. Therefore 
this section will explore the evaluation criteria of the different reports. 
PITI was developed by the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) which is a 
non-profit organisation based in Beijing and Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC), a 
non-profit international environmental advocacy group based in New York. 
The reason for the thesis not simply using air pollution statistics is that air pollution has a 
multitude of variables to consider, such as what type of pollution should be analysed, how 
does particular pollution react according to the seasons and weather in each region, how much 
pollution is produced outside the region. Furthermore when one type of pollution is being 
reduced it may cause the increase in another, which is beyond the scope and outside the theme 
of the thesis. (Chia, 2014)  
Since 2008, the evaluation criteria on the PITI reports have been the following; 
(1) Records of enterprise violation (28 pts) 
(2) Result of enforcement campaigns against pollution facilities (8pts) 
(3) Clean production audit information (8 pts) 
(4) Enterprise environmental performance ratings (8 pts) 
(5) Disposition of verified petitions and complaints (18 pts) 
(6) Environmental Impact Assessment: reports and projects completion approvals (8 pts) 
(7) Discharge fee data (4 pts) 
(8) Response to public information requests (18 pts) 
Source: PITI report 2008 
Total of 100 points, the higher score the better. 
However in 2013 the criteria changed and was updated in accordance with the new and 
revised environmental laws and regulations, for instance that environmental information 
disclosure has been established by law and that MEP requires real time disclosure of online 
pollution-source monitoring data, which various provinces have been able to achieve.  
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The new criteria; 
(1) Publication of excessive emissions and other violation records (23 pts) 
(2) Enterprise environmental performance assessment (5 pts) 
(3) Publication of emission fees (2 pts) 
(4) Disclosure of online monitoring information (20 pts) 
(5) Petitions and complaints (7 pts) 
(6) Disclosure upon application (8 pts) 
(7) Disclosure of key enterprise emission statistics (16 pts) 
(8) Publication of clean production audit information (4 pts) 
(9) Environmental impact information (15 pts) 
Source: PITI report 2013-2014 
Compared to the old criteria, the new criteria have more emphasis on the disclosure of data 
rather than to look specifically for violations. For instance, now the score is based on whether 
the local governments disclose such data, not whether such violations occur. The standard is 
still based on Chinas pollution-source monitoring information and disclosure system however. 
This has led to a significant drop in average score in the 2013-2014 report, one of the reasons 
for the sharp drop in PITI scores is because of independent monitoring of air the air quality, 
which makes it easier to detect inconsistencies of local government reports. Another reason, 
as shown above, the criteria is much stricter concerning reports on environmental impact 
information and the disclosure of key emission statistics (PITI, 2013-2014) 
As stipulated in the latest PITI report (2013-2014), the change in indicators occurred because 
data is more accessible than in the past and several laws has been revised to enhance 
environmental information disclosure. One such law is the newly revised (2014) 
Environmental Protection Law (EP Law), for instance, according to article 47; “The people´s 
governments at and above the county level shall establish public monitoring and early 
warning mechanisms for environmental pollution, organize the development of early warning 
plans (…)”, which requires local governments by law to increase environmental monitoring. 
The law also include local environmental protection institutions and MEP to increase 
monitoring and disclosing environmental information. According to article 53; local 
environmental protection institutions “(…) shall, according to the law, disclose environmental 
information (…)”; article 54, MEP “(…) shall release information on environmental quality 
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and the monitoring of key pollution sources (…)”; local environmental protection institutions 
“(…) shall, according to the law, disclose information on environmental quality (…)”. 
According to article 68; Where a local peoples government at any level or the environmental 
protection administrative department or any other department with environmental protection 
supervision and administrative functions of a people´s government at or above the county 
level commits any of the following acts, the directly liable person in charge and other directly 
liable persons shall be subject to a demerit, a major demerit or demotion; and if the 
consequences are serious, they shall be removed from office or expelled, and the primary 
person in charge thereof shall resign to assume the responsibility for the act. This includes 
(1) “altering or forging monitoring data or instigating others to do so; (2) Failing to disclose 
environmental information as otherwise legally required.” (EP Law) 
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3. Central-local Relations Theory 
The thesis will showcase the effects environmental policy has had on central-local relations 
by analysing the Prevention Plan through central-local relations theory. The theory will 
operationalize environmental policy into central-local relations as well as to provide a 
framework within which the prevention Plan can be understood and the research findings can 
be interpreted (Bryman, 2008).   
According to Zheng (2007), the theoretical discussion about central-local relations in China 
can be divided into three approaches; i.e. the structural approach; the procedural approach; 
and, the cultural approach. The structural approach examines the formal structure of the 
Chinese system while the procedural approach focuses on how the system works on a 
behavioural level. The cultural approach on the other hand is a more abstract approach that 
uses culture to explain the relationship and behaviour between the centre and the local 
governments, therefore, not a lot of attention will be given to this approach. According to 
Zheng (2007) to understand central-local relations one must make use of all three approaches, 
or in this thesis case, the first two approaches, and since the thesis is going to use the authors 
theory of de facto federalism, the thesis will make a short summery of the different concepts 
and how it is related to the thesis.  
3.1 Structural Approach 
The structural approach involves three different models that focus on different level of 
government. The totalitarian model views central-local relations from perspective of the 
centre, while the pluralist model views central-local relations from the perspective of the 
provinces. The cellular model on the other hand emphasises a balance between both.  
The totalitarian model is based on the concept that the local governments are agents of the 
centre and follow the directives of the centre to the letter. The explanation for decentralization 
occurring is that the centre allowed it to happen and that the centre could just as easily 
recentralize again if they wanted to. It is also generally believed, among the totalitarians 
model advocates, that; “general policies were formulated at the centre, but provinces were 
allowed flexibility in their implementation (Zheng, 2007; 9)”. 
The pluralist model on the other hand, stipulates that local governments plays an essential part 
in the central policy making process and is not just agents of the centre. They argue that the 
centre provides the local governments with general directives in which they have the 
flexibility to adapt to the regional conditions of their jurisdiction. In Zheng (2007), according 
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to the pluralist model; “(…) the power of the provincial government comes from the very fact 
that, due to great diversities among different provinces, the central government is not able to 
make a decision applicable to all regions (Zheng, 2007; 12)”. 
According to the Cellular model, the interaction between the centre and provinces are not 
following a formal organisational formula because the centre is not always able to get policies 
implemented in the provinces. Hence, on an operational level, there is a balance between the 
centre and the provinces and decentralization was an inevitable process. According to the 
cellular model; “policies made in Beijing bear little resemblance to the reality at lower levels. 
There is a great concentration of power in the hands of provincial-level officials and leaders 
of lower-level units (Zheng, 2007; 15)” 
Zheng (2007) argues that; “(…) local governments does have autonomy in its decision-
making, but its decision-making process is constrained by given institutional conditions 
(Zheng 2007; 13)”. Basically the centre has an institutional advantage in the power relation 
because they provide institutional settings in which local governments behave, at least 
according to the structural approach. A common theme in the structural approach is the 
overemphasis on how various economic factors affect central-local relations. Zheng (2007) 
argues that, economic indicators is an imperfect measurement of the relative powers between 
the central and local government, thus fiscal indicators is insufficient to address issues such as 
implementation problems. 
Procedural Approach 
The procedural approach is more appropriate to explain implementation issues and the 
approach has one model, the fragmentation model. The fragmentation model simply stipulates 
that local governments increase influence in economic decision-making and that no single 
body has authority over the other, resulting in fragmentation of authority. In other words, the 
procedural approach does not consider the centre helpless relative to the power of local 
governments, and still acknowledges the relative autonomy of the provinces. This allows us to 
see how central-local conflicts are produced and how they are resolved. According to Zheng 
(2007), “the procedural approach regards central-local relations as the function of discrete 
strategic interaction between the centre and the provinces to achieve consensus (Zheng, 2007; 
23)”. 
Zheng (2007) argues that all three approaches are necessary to properly understand the 
central-local relations in China. However, for the purposes of the thesis, only the first two is 
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considered because the cultural approach is too abstract to be analytically useful, for instance 
the political culture in China and the values it creates. Therefore the thesis argues that 
institutional arrangements dictate the behaviour of local governments, while simultaneously 
emphasises the importance in analysing through the perspective of both the centre and the 
provinces.  
De Facto Federalism 
In most relevant literature, the fiscal indicators are over emphasized in central-local relations 
theory, and because the thesis is looking at central-local relations through environmental 
indicators, the researcher believe that the thesis will be able to contribute to central-local 
relations discussion when making use of Zheng (2007) de facto federalism.  
De Facto Federalism argues that there are three zones in central-local relations, two of which 
already explained in the literature review. The power is divided between the centrally dictated 
zone where the centre have exclusive decision-making power; mainly political issues 
concerning the country as a whole, and the locally dictated zone where the local governments 
have exclusive decision-making power on local policies; mainly on economic and 
environmental issues. However, Zheng (2007) also argues that there is an overlapping and 
bargaining zone where the power is shared and policies are made by the centre, but 
implemented by local governments.  
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Source: Zheng 2007; 40 
Figure 2.1 The Division of Power between the Centre and the Provinces  
The thesis argues that environmental policy inhibits the bargaining zone and that the centre 
aims to move environmental policy to the centrally dictated zone through centralization. The 
thesis have so far discovered that the policies of the Prevention Plan favours the top down 
approach, therefore the thesis argues that the centre wants to eliminate local government 
involvement on environmental policy as much as possible. The main warrant for this is that 
the Prevention Plan introduces accountability measures while simultaneously not change the 
behaviour of local governments on environmental protection. 
In Qi and Zhang (2014), the authors provide an institutional analysis that focuses on the 
central-local institutional arrangements. Qi and Zhang (2014) argue that; “(…) the actions of 
the agency are a reflection only to its supervising body (Qi et al., 2014; 205)”. In the case of 
the thesis, it means that the actions of the local governments are a reflection of the centre, 
meaning the centre can control the behaviour of local governments, through the institutional 
environment. Thus the centre provides constraints as well as incentives to control the 
behaviour of local government. According to Qi and Zhang (2014); “an incentive is simply a 
reward – a positive feedback (payoff) – while constraints limits the move for action (it defines 
the space of choices of the local governments) (Qi et al., 2014; 206)”. Thus the thesis argues 
that the Prevention Plan does not provide any additional incentives, as well as constraints to 
allow effective local environmental enforcement. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Epistemology and ontology 
I do not adopt to the positivist notion that knowledge can only be confirmed by the senses, 
rather, knowledge that does, enhance research that also applies theory into its argumentation. 
For instance, I reject the notion that research can be value free, because the very instant a 
topic is chosen, the thesis sees to be fully objective. Therefore it is important to make 
perfectly clear your intensions of doing the research. In the example of this thesis, I chose this 
topic and country because I find the Chinese government system fascinating and that upon 
reading about environmental protests and civil society in the People´s Republic of China, I 
believe that environmental issues have had and will have a great impact on Chinese 
governance in the future. (Bryman, 2008) 
Therefore the thesis uses the epistemological notion of critical realism, for instance, the 
research questions will be answered both empirically and through theory, thus there is a 
positivist and an interpretivist model. The empirical answer will constitute of the 
environmental information disclosure data and will answer whether the Prevention Plan has 
been successful in its intended purposes and whether the Prevention Plan is centralizing 
power or not. While the theory will answer the underlying reasons for the policies in the 
Prevention Plan. Furthermore, though economic growth discourse has been the main political 
discourse in China, it is changing which can be seen by the various reforms presented in the 
thesis, therefore the researcher employ the ontological consideration of constructivism. 
(Bryman, 2008) 
4.2 Research design 
The thesis is going to do a case study research to make a comprehensive analysis of the 
Prevention Plan and, as the thesis is going to use the PITI reports to do a secondary data 
analysis from the years 2011 to 2014 to find the change in between those years, the thesis is 
also going to employ a longitudinal design.  (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2009)  
4.3 Primary data 
The thesis will use official policy reports and legal documents to analyse the Prevention Plan 
and its relevant laws and environmental institutions. Contrary to the references found in the 
bibliography, (Cf. e.g. APPC Law; Prevention Plan; EIA Law; EP Law) the legal documents 
are original documents from the standing committee of the National´s People´s Congress, 
both in Chinese as well as English, which is not available online. As well as a copy of the 
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original policy report on the Prevention Plan from the State Council. Unfortunately, this 
particular document is in Chinese, thus only the exact cities that are included in the Key 
Regions as well as its respective city clusters has been translated. 
4.4 Secondary Data 
The thesis began by generating a hypothesis from the subject of Chinese governance and air 
pollution, which then led to the testing of said hypothesis through a secondary data analysis. 
The secondary data analysis includes the environmental information disclosure data from the 
PITI reports which will be later tested empirically. The data involves the inclusion of 65 cities 
that are both included in the Key Regions Plan of the Prevention Plan, as well as in the Key 
Cities Plan of the APPC Law (incidentally the PITI report is based on the Key Cities Plan). 
The thesis will analyse the data over time between 2011 and 2014, hence the research strategy 
employed in this thesis is considered to be a quantitative research strategy. (Bryman, 2008) 
The sample will involve the same cities each year, the thesis will study the ranking of each 
city and the change that occur between them to analyse the cities change in environmental 
information disclosure overtime by considering the implications of the Prevention Plan. The 
change in ranking in the sample of cities will be analysed between 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 
(and 2014) to make an assessment on how the change illuminates the success or failure of the 
Prevention Plan in preventing and controlling air pollution. Therefore, the Prevention Plan is 
the independent variable and the city governments are the dependent variable. 
The sample of 65 cities is based on PITI reports sample of 120 cities, which is based on the 
Key Cities plan in the APPC Law, as well as the Prevention Plan, which is a different plan 
that designates 113 cities for environmental protection. Only 65 of the Prevention Plan´s cities 
are included in the PITI report, therefore only those 65 will be analysed, further details about 
the sample of cities will be provided later in the thesis. 
4.5 Limitations 
With the secondary data there are validity issues, one being the change in indicators already 
explained earlier in the thesis. The PITI report changed the indicators in 2013 which is the 
reason why 2013 and 2014 is evaluated simultaneously. As a result, the scores declined 
drastically among all the cities, which meant that the score was no longer comparable over 
time. Furthermore, the thesis started before the English translation of the 2013-2014 PITI 
report was finished, therefore the change came as a surprise for the researcher, and had to 
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make due of what was available, meaning that the ranks of each city would be assessed 
instead of their score. 
4.5.1 Internal Validity 
Nevertheless, just the fact that all the cities in the PITI report have reduced their score because 
of the change in indicators validates the thesis argument even further. According to the 2013-
2014 PITI report, the areas that most cities failed in and is indeed the reason for the sharp 
drop in average score, is the disclosure of emission data from key enterprises and 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) information, which accounts for 12.7% and 5% 
respectively by all the 120 cities. Therefore, regardless of the ranking of the cities, this 
statistic alone signifies a major lack of key environmental data. (PITI 2013-2014) 
Furthermore, to improve the internal validity, the thesis has provided a counter argument to 
the hypothesis of the thesis. As explained in the literature review, it is possible that the 
Prevention Plan is a policy experimentation and the fact that there are both centralizing and 
decentralizing measures in the Prevention Plan may indicate that the Plan is doing neither, 
which would explain the lack of reforms in the behaviour of local governments towards 
environmental protection. (Yin, 2009) 
4.5.2 Construct validity 
There are also short comings in the thesis specific measures, for instance, the thesis does not 
have multiple sources of evidence, though the thesis have access to the various laws relevant 
to the measures of the Prevention Plan, the thesis does not have any other source of data on 
environmental information disclosure than the PITI report. (Yin, 2009) 
4.5.3 External validity 
As in most case studies, there are some issues of external validity, for instance, the thesis 
generalise a conclusion about all the 113 cities in the Prevention Plan even though only 65 
cities is included in the PITI sample of 120. However, as the thesis will later argue; because 
the 65 cities in the sample are included in the Key Cities Plan (PITI report) as well as the 
Prevention Plan, validates the case sample. The plans were established for different reasons 
which make these particular cities both politically sensitive and important for both economic 
and international reputation reasons. This will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis 
chapter. This however makes replication impossible since the data is limited to these 65 
specific cities and cannot be tested outside this specific case. (Yin, 2009) 
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Furthermore, though there are some concerns about the ability of case study research to 
generalise outside the single case, the thesis argues that there is a difference between 
generalising environmental information data and generalising the results into a broader 
theory. Yin (2009) provides an example between survey research which relies on statistical 
generalisation; “in which a sample is intended to generalize to a larger universe (Yin 2009: 
43)”, and analytical generalisation. Analytical generalization is about generalizing a set of 
results into a broader theory, meaning in this case, that the Prevention Plan might be 
unsuccessful in preventing and controlling air pollution because the centre avoids local 
government interaction instead of changing its behaviour.  
The biggest weakness in validity is however the fact that the source of the secondary data 
comes from an NGO, the researcher have to consider the possibility that the motives of the 
NGO might be less than honourable, and that corrupt intentions may influence the final result 
of the reports, even though it is a non-profit organisation. (Yin, 2009) 
4.5.4 Reliability 
The sample of cities is decided by the cities represented in the Prevention Plan and those 
cities that are included in the PITI report. To know the cities of the Prevention Plan one needs 
access to the official plan from State Council, the PITI report on the other hand is available 
online for anyone to access. Thus data collection is repeatable, though the data can be 
interpreted differently. (Yin, 2009) Furthermore, the reliability is a given, considering that the 
thesis is doing a longitudinal case, thus the stability of the measure has already been tested 
and retested. (Bryman, 2008) 
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5. Empirical Data 
The pollution transparency index (PITI) provides data annually on environmental information 
disclosure, and since it is the responsibility of local governments to disclose such data, the 
thesis argues that the PITI reports may be able to prove the relative success or failure of the 
Prevention Plan and answer whether the centre is centralizing power on environmental policy. 
The graphs was compiled by using excel, and the graph shows the change in ranking between 
the different years. For example, between 2011 and 2012, Beijing changed its ranking from 
rank 7 in 2011 to rank 6 in 2012. Therefore, the change is (+1) because Beijing improved its 
ranking by a value of one. The cities are arranged into their individual city clusters. A detailed 
report on the specific cities can be found in the appendix. 
 
Between 2011 and 2012, there were large fluctuations in the change in ranking, however even 
though there were regions that had less change than others, the different size of the regions 
makes it impossible to make an assessment between regions. However one can determine that 
the change is spread among all the city clusters instead of being centred into individual 
clusters. Therefore, most city clusters had cities that made larger change in their ranking as 
well as cities with smaller change. For instance, Mianyang in the Chengdu-Chongqing city 
cluster increased their ranking by a value of (+75) while Yinbin in the same clusters increased 
their ranking by a value of (+3). Anshan in the central Liaoning city cluster is also a city with 
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large change, it decreased its ranking by a value of (-51) while Benxi of the same cluster 
increased their ranking by a value of (+12). 
 
 
Between 2012 and 2013 the change is centred in specific clusters, clearly showing which 
regions that made the greatest change. We can see that in the Jing-Jin-Ji Yangtze River Delta 
and Ganning city clusters, the change was marginal compared to most cities in the Chengdu-
Chongqing, Pearl River Delta, Central Liaoning, Shandong Peninsula and Western Taiwan 
straits, which have many cities with a change value of 40 and above. However what we can 
distinguish between said city clusters is, almost all the cities between the Chengdu-Chongqing 
and Central Liaoning city clusters decreased their ranking, while almost all the cities in the 
Shandong Peninsula and Western Taiwan straits city clusters increased their ranking 
significantly. The cities with the largest change is, Chongqing in the Chengdu-Chongqing city 
cluster, which decreased its ranking by a value of (-86) and Weifang in the Shandong city 
cluster, which increased by a value of (+82).  
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Not many cities are consistently increasing or decreasing their ranking before and after the 
change in indicators, rather most cities made improvement the first year and decreased 
significantly the second year, or the other way around. Unfortunately, nothing conclusive has 
come of this data in terms of the relative success or failure of the Prevention Plan, as well as 
to answer the question if this would prove that the centre is centralizing power. Therefore, the 
thesis will make a descriptive analysis of the observations of the data. 
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6. Analysis 
To sum up the findings so far; there is a conflict between economic development and 
environmental protection. (Qi et al., 2014) The thesis has discovered that there are a multitude 
of reasons for this; The local governments has a high level of autonomy when it comes to 
economic decision making, as well as environmental policy making. This makes the centre 
unable to directly control said local policies, decentralization has however been effective in 
boosting economic growth in China. (Zheng, 2006) Thus it is unlikely that the centre would 
want to change the current system that would risk annual growth rate. Therefore the centre 
developed a different way to ensure local governments compliance, by controlling the 
behaviour of local officials. 
 
The centre controls local behaviour through the use of performance evaluation, however 
despite current efforts to make environmental performance relevant in the evaluation, the 
performance evaluation still favours economic performance rather than environmental 
performance. Therefore, since the centre has built a system in which the incentive for local 
officials is to receive promotion for their performance in office; (Easton et al., 2014) and since 
the performance is mainly based on economic growth, the local officials will thus act 
accordingly. Hence, it is not the local officials that refuse to care about environmental 
protection, instead they; “act within the institutional environment in which the formal rules 
are set by the central government (…) (Qi et al., 2014; 205)”.  
 
The Prevention Plan is the first comprehensive environmental protection plan that is issued by 
the centre, (CAAC policy briefing, 2012) therefore it is safe to say that the policies of the plan 
reflects the will of the centre. The policies of the Plan show that the centre is not willing to 
change the institutional arrangements to prevent and control air pollution. The warrant for this 
is that the punishment for not meeting the air quality standards is aimed at the local 
government as an administrative unit. (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) Hence, the loss of 
autonomy does not affect the performance evaluation of the local officials; and since the 
thesis have already established that it is the local officials that set the directives of the local 
government, the local governments are not incentivised to enforce environmental protection.  
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Source: author‟s compilation 
Figure 3.1 Thesis argumentation   
 
So, how well has the Prevention Plan been in preventing and controlling air pollution? The 
amount of data from the PITI reports will not only reflect the performance of the Prevention 
Plan but also reflect the level of compliance of local governments to the measures of the 
Prevention Plan. Both will illuminate whether the centre is centralizing power or not. 
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6.1 Significance of the Prevention Plan 
However, one question remain; how can the thesis analyse the result of the Prevention Plan by 
just including 65 out of 113 cities of the Key Regions? The APPC Law designates 120 key 
control cities for environmental protection. The thesis argues that because the law is an early 
attempt towards environmental protection, these cities are both politically and economically 
important, which the centre would prioritise to avoid instability in those cities, in light of the 
increasing environmental protests. For instance, according to the APPC Law, article 17; the 
Key Cities includes municipalities directly under the central government and provincial 
capitals. As well as costal open cities and key tourist cities are that attract a lot of international 
attention and are the main hubs for foreign direct investments.  
 
The State Council shall, in accordance with the general plan for urban development, the 
target of the environmental protection plan and the quality of the urban atmospheric 
environment, designate some cities as key cities for control of air pollution. Municipalities 
directly under the central government, provincial capitals, costal open cities and key tourist 
cities shall be designated as key cities for the control of air pollution (…) (APPC Law, article 
17, 2000) 
In contrast, the thesis argues that the Prevention Plan emphasises environmental protection 
further than in the APPC Law, because the Plan is a manifestation of citizen discontent. The 
different purposes of the designated Key Cities and the Key Regions can be found in the fact 
that the sample of cities is not the same. Therefore, not only is the 65 cities politically 
sensitive areas, but also high level polluters, hence the thesis argues that these particular cities 
are cities which the centre would pressure the most to improve its air quality. 
Besides the Key Control Regions in the Prevention Plan, the plan also classifies 47 cities as 
key control areas, where the regulations are even stricter and the requirements on pollution 
control even more stringent.  
The six cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei key control area include Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Baoding and Langfang. The fourteen city in the Yangtze River Delta 
key control area include Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuxi, Changzhou, Suzhou, Nantong, Yangzhou, 
Zhenjiang, Taizhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing and Pearl River Delta 
key control area consists of nine cities. Central Liaoning key control area includes Shenyang. 
Shandong Province key control area includes Jinan, Qingdao, Zibo, and Weifang. Wuhan key 
control area includes Wuhan and its surrounding areas. Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan region 
37 
 
key control area is Changsha. Chengdu-Chongqing region key control area includes 
Chongqing and Chengdu. Straits Fujian key control area is Fuzhou and Sanming. Central 
and Northern Shanxi‟s key control area is Taiyuan. Xi‟an and Xianyang is the key control 
area of Shaanxi Guanzhong. Gansu-Ningxia region key control area is Lanzhou and 
Yinchuan. Xinjiang Province‟s key control area is Urumqi. (CAAC policy briefing 2012; 15) 
Naturally, considering the 65 cities that has been stipulated as the most politically sensitive 
and polluted cities in China, these 47 cities have even more pressure to improve their air 
quality. However, after analysing the results from the data, these cities do not provide a clear 
difference compared to the other 18 cities, in terms of change in ranking. Furthermore, the 
fact that 40 cities out of 47 are included in the thesis sample validates the importance of the 
sample as an analytical case.  
Regional cooperation is the main feature of the Prevention Plan, the reason for the emphasis 
on regional cooperation is because of the close proximity of the cities in the city clusters; “as 
urban environment continues to expand and develop, atmospheric circulation causes the 
pollution interaction and transmission between cities to become more prominent (CAAC 
policy briefing 2012; 8)”. This means that a large portion of city pollution often comes from 
outside sources and the centre has realised that local governments cannot control air pollution 
on their own. Thus combining several cities into one administrative area and to develop 
environmental policies on both local and regional level is necessary to reduce air pollution. 
However because of the economic autonomy city governments enjoy, they seek to improve 
land development and attract foreign direct invest within their own jurisdiction, which cause 
great competition between city governments. (Shen, 2007)  
The Prevention Plan makes several guiding ideas and objectives on what local governments 
should do in order to reduce and control air pollution, but the plan does not introduce any 
policies which would enable local governments to perform what the plan suggests. For 
instance the Prevention Plan states that; “(…) a regional air pollution joint prevention and 
control mechanism should be established to achieve unified planning, monitoring, 
management, evaluation and coordination (CAAC policy briefing 2012; 11)”. The plan does 
not explicitly provide the means or the incentives for local government to create these 
mechanisms, rather the policies inform what the local governments should do, not how it will 
be accomplished practically. This means that centre is dependent on the compliance of the 
local governments to implement the measures of the Prevention Plan. 
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The regional management mechanisms introduced in the plan are:  
1. Establish unified joint regional prevention and control coordination mechanism. 
2. Establish regional joint air quality enforcement supervision and management Mechanism. 
3. Establish environmental impact assessment consultation mechanism for major projects. 
4. Establish environmental information mechanisms. 
5. Establish advance warning and emergency response mechanism for regional pollution. 
6. Improve fiscal subsidies incentive policy. 
7. Further expand price and financial trade policy. 
8. Improve VOCs pollution charges policy. 
9. Fully implement pollution discharge permit system. 
10. Implement key industry environmental protection inspection. 
11. Implement regulation on construction& operation of pollution facilities. 
12. Implement Environmental information disclosure system. 
13. Advanced city ambient air quality target management. 
14. Establish a unified regional air quality monitoring system. 
Source: CAAC policy briefing 2012; 35-40 
6.2 Performance of the Prevention Plan 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a system in which regular environmental 
information is necessary to provide accurate assessment of the environmental impact of 
projects. This system is heavily emphasized by the Prevention Plan to the point where it is 
illegal to construct coal factories in the key regions. Therefore, the EIA system is the most 
effective tool of local environmental protection institutions to prevent and control air 
pollution. Hence, the thesis argues that the amount of environmental data disclosed to EIA 
will determine how successful the local governments have been in meeting the air quality 
standards.  
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Source: author‟s compilation 
Figure 3.2 Thesis argumentation 
6.2.1 Environmental protection Bureau  
The local environmental protection institution includes, the Environmental Protection Bureaus 
(EPB), which handles environmental affairs on a provincial, prefectural or county level of 
government. Funding comes from respective local governments which provide salaries, office 
space etc. to the EPBs. Their responsibilities include; overseeing the EIA; monitoring 
industrial pollution output; initiating legal actions against firms that do not comply with 
environmental regulations; ensuring public information disclosure; as well as education and 
awareness building. Furthermore, according to Hsu (2013), the local EPBs are required to 
fund an Environmental Monitoring Centre which is in charge of several general 
responsibilities, mainly providing data for the purposes of public reporting and 
communication. Because of EPBs many responsibilities in combination with the fact that their 
entire funding comes from local governments make the institution highly vulnerable to 
corruption. (Hsu, 2013; Qiu, 2008) Additionally, the data that EPBs are supposed to collect 
from industrial enterprises is being self-reported and only a quarter of the industrial 
enterprises are being monitored, thus fabrication of data is highly likely. Furthermore, the 
EPBs are only monitoring a small fraction of the industrial enterprises which makes it 
extremely difficult to make an accurate environmental assessment. (Hsu, 2013) 
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According to Hsu (2013) provincial and local EPBs are much less autonomous than relevant 
literature may indicate. For instance, in terms of monitoring, the EPBs are limited to what 
data they can collect and some data is only collected after major environmental pollution 
occur, especially ones that receive international headlines. Furthermore EPBs are often unsure 
on what data they are allowed to report because the centre is vague on what environmental 
data constitutes as a national security issue, thus there are limitations to the amount of data the 
EPBs collect and report. This indicates that the centre has much more control over local 
institutions than one might think, which means that local EPBs have to consider the interests 
of the centre and local government when collecting environmental data. (Hsu, 2013) 
Local EPBs as an institution is therefore extremely restricted in their capabilities to monitor 
and report environmental data, as well as its capabilities to prevent illegal construction 
projects. However, the 2014 revision of the EP Law article 24, provide the legal authority of 
local EPBs to “(…) conduct the on-site inspection of enterprises, public institutions, and other 
business that discharge pollution”; also, article 25 provide the legal authority to “(…) seize or 
impound the facilities or equipment causing the discharge of pollutants”. Other articles in the 
newly revised EP Law includes article 44, which stipulates that EPBs at provincial level can 
“(…) suspend the procedures for approving the environmental impact assessment documents 
on construction projects (…)”. This means that from 2014, if pollution exceeds the new 
ambient environmental standards, provincial EPBs have the legal basis to cancel construction 
projects.  
Furthermore, the EP Law gives EPBs the legal authority, and local governments the 
responsibility, to supervise environmental protection. According to article, 67 of the EP Law, 
Provincial governments and provincial EPBs “(…) shall strengthen supervision over the 
environmental protection work of the people´s governments at lower levels and the relevant 
departments thereof (…); if local EPBs “(…) fails to impose administrative punishment as 
otherwise legally required (…) EPBs (…) at a higher level may directly make a decision to 
impose administrative punishment.” However, without political basis, these laws do not have 
any substance, as already discussed in the literature review. The Prevention Plan do not 
provide any explicit authority to the EPBs, rather, it enhances the EIA system as a tool for 
local environmental enforcement. 
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6.2.2 Environmental Impact Assessment  
The EIA system was first implemented in the 1970s and has sense then been revised multiple 
times, in contemporary China; “(…) Environmental Impact Assessment System - has 
gradually evolved and developed into a legal system, in the form of articles in relevant laws 
(e.g., article 11 in the APPC Law) as well as a stand along piece of legislation (the EIA law) 
since 2012 (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02; 15)”. The system has become one of Chinas 
main regulatory instruments for environmental protection and the intent of the EIA system is 
to assess the environmental impact of construction projects. MEP has the responsibility in 
overseeing and coordinating EIA implementation on a national level, while Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) oversees EIA on a local level. Therefore if project is deemed to 
cause more pollution than environmental standards and regulations allow, MEP and local 
EPBs have the authority to deny the construction of the project. (Wang et al., 2003) 
An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is needed to be submitted for construction projects to 
be allowed, however there are three categories that determine the necessity of an EIR;  
 Category A: Projects which are likely to cause a range of significant adverse 
environmental impact need to produce an EIR. 
 Category B: Projects which are likely cause to a limited number of significant adverse 
environmental impacts need to produce an Environmental Impact Form (EIF). 
 Category C: Projects not expected significant adverse environmental impacts do not 
require a EIA but should fill in an Environmental Impact Registration Form (EIRF)  
Source: Wang et al., 2003; 552 
The agency that produces the EIR need to be approved by MEP under the EIA Licence 
System, furthermore only MEP, provincial, autonomous region or municipal (Prefectural) 
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), and county EPBs has the jurisdiction of approving 
an EIR. 
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According to Wang et al. (2003) and article 10, 13, 14, 17 of the Law of the People´s 
Republic of China on Appraising of Environmental Impacts (EIA Law) the process for an EIR 
is; 
1. After the developer has submitted the project proposal, MEP and local EPBs decides 
whether an EIR is necessary or not. There are two main criteria on how to assess the 
environmental impact of proposed projects;  
 
(…) (1) „pollutant discharge‟, relating to emission volume, types and complexity of 
pollutants, and the possibilities of abatement; and (2) „sensitive area‟, based on the 
importance of ecological, archaeological and cultural value and numbers and 
sensitivity of humans affected (Wang et. al., 2003; 555). 
 
2. If an EIR is required the developer need to request a licensed agency to make an EIA 
action outline, when the outline has been approved by the local EPB the developer 
need to contract a licensed agency to conduct the impact assessment. 
3. The impact assessment team then needs to request environmental information from the 
local environmental monitor stations, which every local EPB is required to fund. 
4. To determine the significance of the environmental impact, EIA is comparing the 
legislative and regulatory requirements, established environmental standards or 
pollution abatement requirements with the predicted environmental impact of the 
proposed project. Mitigation measures should also be considered into the EIR. 
5. When the EIR is complete, it is reviewed by the local EPB in consultation with other 
relevant authorities involved in the project. 
6. Lastly a decision is made by MEP and local EPBs whether or not the project will 
proceed. 
After the construction has begun, the EPB and the developer are required to monitor the 
construction process to make sure that the production process and products are in accordance 
with the EIR and complying with environmental standards set out in the EIR. (Wang et. al., 
2003) 
Though the EIA system is fairly straightforward, the framework of the EIA is very complex. 
For instance, the EIA law has institutionalized strategic environmental assessment which 
incorporates plans and programs into the EIA framework instead of just focusing on projects. 
Furthermore, According to Wang et. al. (2003); “the Environmental Protection Law (EP Law) 
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sets out basic requirements for impacts assessment, but this is then elaborated in more than a 
dozen specific sector laws and numerous regulations and ordinances (Wang et. al., 2003; 
559)”. However, because the Prevention Plan only focuses on construction projects the EIA 
framework becomes much easier to define.  
The Prevention Plan introduces stricter enforcement of EIA regulations and overall 
strengthens the implementation of EIA in the regions included in the plan while regions 
excluded in the plan are less strict. Besides the restrictions on projects discussed above, the 
Prevention Plan makes sure that EIA completely prohibit or highly restrict investment in high 
pollution industries, such as coal fired power plants, iron and steel building materials, coking, 
non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals and chemicals. Furthermore, according to the IGES policy 
report (2013); 
The Prevention Plan states that; (…) industrial construction projects which fail to receive EIA 
approval should not receive approvals for construction (or even have their applications 
reviewed or considered), production licenses, safety production licenses, or emission permits 
(IGES policy report, No. 2013-02; 53). 
Therefore, according to the EP Law, article 19; as EIA is legally required in the preparation of 
construction projects, the EIA system becomes a powerful tool for environmental protection. 
Furthermore, the EP Law also states that if said projects or plan have not undergone an EIA, 
they may not be commenced or implemented.  
What is noticeable is that the EIA law enhances the central government‟s ability to control air 
pollution output in the provinces, as well as enhances the authority of MEP and local EPBs. In 
other words the EIA law increases the centres influence over local environmental protection 
institutions without directly going through local government channels and communication. 
Therefore EIA is the most effective tool of local EPBs to prevent and control air pollution. 
However, the EIA should not be overestimated because the underlying problem of local 
environmental enforcement of environmental regulation lies in the fact that the institutional 
environment still favours economic growth over environmental protection. Thus, since it is 
the local government‟s responsibility to disclose environmental information to EIA, the EIA 
system has some sever restrictions. 
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6.2.3 Air Quality standards 
The thesis has made arguments that the local governments in the key regions will not be able 
to meet the air quality standards if they do not disclose environmental information to EIA. 
Therefore a short analysis of the main futures of the new environmental standards will be 
analysed in this section. 
“Environmental standards refer to a set of technical requirements established to meet the 
environmental legislative goals of protecting environmental quality and controlling pollution 
(Qiu, 2008; 14)”. Since 2011, the new standards have been developed gradually, the standard 
include; (1) ambient air quality standard; (2) industrial emission standards; and (3) vehicle 
emission standards. (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) 
The standards are too technical to make an empirical assessment of whether the new standards 
are strict relative to the capabilities of the local governments. However MEP has made 
considerations into the characteristics of air pollution and the capabilities of the local 
governments when realising the new (1) ambient air quality standards, thus this particular 
standard are not the same from region to region. The goal is that every city in China will 
follow the same standards eventually, therefore MEP requires local governments to prepare 
for the implementation of the standards, such as, installation of new equipment, procedures to 
manage data quality, and training for operational staff. 74 cities in the key regions have 
already started monitoring since of 2012 and supposedly the rest of the 59 key cities will have 
implemented the monitoring network and public reporting system by 2013. (IGES policy 
report, No. 2013-02) 
Another considerably revised standard is the (2) industrial emission standards, which 
stipulates that even new sources of pollution should meet the environmental standards 
regardless of the impact. This means that if a coal factory is constructed in an area where 
pollution from coal factories previously didn‟t exist will have to follow the standards 
regardless of how little impact it have had so far, because it is a new emission source. 
Furthermore specifically six industries (thermal power, Iron, steel, petrochemicals, cement, 
non-ferrous metals and chemicals) need to follow the international emission limits on air born 
pollution in 47 cities. (IGES policy report, No. 2013-02) 
(3)The vehicle emission standards are based on the European standards, which mean that 
previously allowed cars for retail is not allowed to be produced anymore and heavy duty 
gasoline cars already sold, both domestically produced or imported, must follow the new 
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standards as well. There are different levels of strictness in the vehicle emission standards, 
from phase one to phase five, five being the strictest, thus the fifth phase is only encouraged if 
feasible. An annual environmental protection attainment examination system for cars will also 
be implemented in the 113 key cities, and the cars that do not follow the attainment standards 
will be marked as outdate , thus these kinds of cars will eventually be phased out. (IGES 
policy report, No. 2013-02) 
All three of the new air quality standards are significant improvement in preventing and 
controlling air pollution considering the measures described above, but it is only the ambient 
air quality standards that have consequences of compliance for local governments. What is 
noticeable however is that MEP has made its way to consider the regional difference when 
releasing the new ambient air quality standards, thus it is not realistic to believe that the centre 
is directly trying to centralise their influence in the local government through these new 
environmental standards. Even though the goal is eventually for all cities in China to have the 
same standards, the standards are particularly more stringent in the key regions. 
The next section will analyse the results from the data to determine whether the local 
governments have been successful in meeting the air quality standards. 
6.3 Data Analysis 
Since nothing conclusive has come from simply analysing the change in ranking, concerning 
whether the centre is centralizing power or if the Prevention Plan has been successful or not. 
The thesis will make a descriptive analysis of the data, followed by a discussion. 
 
6.3.1 2011-2012 PITI Report 
In 2011 the 12
th
 FYP was implemented, and the Prevention Plan was implemented in 2012, 
considering that no change in indicators occurred during 2011 and 2012 the fluctuation ranks 
is un-proportionally large.  
 
According to the data, the fact that large fluctuation occurred without any specific pattern, 
meaning that the change was spread among all regions instead of it being consistent within a 
few regions, shows the importance in local cadre behaviour. The 12
th
 FYP was implemented 
in 2011, however this does not justify the large change in ranking because it is unlikely that 
the 12
th
 FYP could have such large effect on the ranking within just a year. Hence, unless the 
researcher has missed any big events before 2011 that would affect environmental 
information disclosure, the only other explanation would be that it is the high cadre turnover 
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that affects the change. As the thesis has already explained, it is the local officials that set the 
general directives of the local government. Therefore, a change of local leadership could 
justify the change in ranking because the new local cadre has different priorities than its 
predecessor. Furthermore, since the turnover is less than five year, the change in ranking can 
happen quite frequently.  
Since there were many cities that either increased or decreased their ranking greatly during 
this period, the thesis will describe them in this section.  
 
Jing-Jin-Ji  Baoding is the only city  in the Jing-Jin-Ji city cluster which has a 
ranking change above 11, the city decreased its ranking by a value of  
(- 43) 
 
Yangtze River Delta In the Yangtze River delta the change was marginal with a value not 
above 11, some exceptions include, Jiaxing (+ 22), Yangzhou (+ 33), 
Lianyuangang (+ 30), Xuzhou (+ 16), Taizhou (- 16), and Changzhou  
(- 17). 
 
Ganning A rather small city cluster with a total of three cities, with only 
Yinchuan and Lanzhou ranked in the PITI report. Both decreased their 
ranking by a value of (-29) and (- 30) respectively. 
 
Chengdu-Chongqing The city of Mianyang In the Chengdu-Chongqing city cluster has 
without a doubt the largest change of all the 65 cities in 2011-2012 
report, with an improvement value of (+75) and a comparatively lesser 
improvement by Chengdu of a value of (+17), the rest had a marginal 
change not above the value of 5. 
 
Pearl River Delta The largest change in the Pearl River Delta region includes, Zuhai  
(- 34), Foshan (- 23) and Zhongshan (- 15). The rest have no larger 
change value than 9. 
 
Central Liaoning The cities in the central Liaoning cluster have a change value not above 
12, except Anshan (- 51) and Fushun (+ 34) 
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Shandong Peninsula The cities in the Shandong city cluster has marginal change value no 
more than 23, however two cities stands out, Rizhao and Weifang, with 
(+ 30) and (- 47) respectively. 
 
Others The rest of the 13 cities and six city clusters have relatively small 
change, a value of not above 12, except for four cities. Xiamen (- 19), 
Tongchuan (- 40), Baoji (+ 44) and Xianyang (- 25) 
 
6.3.2 2012-2013 PITI Report 
Between 2012 and 2013, the change in indicators occurred, which saw the result of every city 
in the PITI sample reduced their scores significantly which will have an effect on the overall 
rankings. This means that the change in indicators favoured the Shandong peninsula and 
Western Taiwan straits city clusters greatly because the rank increase illustrates that the 
change in indicators of the PITI report favoured the information disclosure system they 
already had in place. While disfavouring the Chengdu-Chongqing, Pearl River Delta, Central 
Liaoning city clusters. Also, though a few cities in the other regions have high change value 
as well and some with low, the relative change compared to the other city clusters mentioned 
above makes the change marginal. Thus the Jing-Jin-Ji, Yangtze River Delta, Ganning, 
Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan, Wuhan Metropolitan region, central and northen Shanxi, 
central Shaanxi and the Urumqi city cluster already had relatively comprehensive 
environmental information disclosure measures in place.  
 
The changes in the rankings will be described in this section. 
 
Jing-Jin-Ji There is small change in the Jing-Jin-Ji city cluster with a value not 
above 6, except Baoding (+13) and Tangshan (+ 24) 
 
Yangtze River Delta The change in the Yangtze River Delta is also relatively small with a 
few exception, Shaoxing (+ 21), Yangcheng (+ 17), Lianyungang  
(+ 32), and Xuzhou (+ 17). 
 
Ganning  Ganning has very small change, not above the value of 11 
 
48 
 
Chengdu-Chongqing  Chongqing in the Chengdu-Chongqing city cluster has the largest 
change between 2012 and 2014 with a decrease value of (-86), the rest 
of the cities has a marginal change, no larger than the value of 17. 
Except Mianyang which have decreased its value by (- 29). 
 
Central Liaoning The cities in the Central Liaoning and Pearl River Delta have almost 
consistently decreased their ranking, except for Zuhai (+ 11). The cities 
with the largest change include, Guangzhou (- 29), Shenzhen (- 27), 
Dongguan (- 49), Foshan (- 33), Benxi (- 53) and Fushun (-32). 
 
Shandong Peninsula Shandong city cluster has the cities with the largest improvement and 
also the only city cluster where every city improved their ranking. The 
largest, and most notable, change is in, Jining (+51), Tai‟an (+ 70), 
Weifang (+82), and Zaozhuang (+80). 
 
Others The rest of the 13 cities in the six remaining city clusters have 
relatively small change with a value of not above 15, with a few 
exception, Xiamen (+68), Taiyuan (-35), and Xianyang (+ 30). 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The literature and data has shown us several reasons to how we can consider the Prevention 
Plan a failure to prevent and control air pollution, as well as the possibility of the centre 
centralizing power. 
The 2011-2012 data has shown that the turnover of local cadres has some impact on the 
environmental information disclosure. As the thesis has already explained, it is the local 
cadres of the local governments that control direction in which the local government will take, 
though some local governments have more pressure to follow the centres directives than 
others. These 65 cities has arguably the most pressure to follow the centre directives, thus 
they should be improving their rankings significantly, however this is not the case. This 
shows that there are not enough incentives or constraints for local officials to improve the 
environmental information disclosure. Therefore changing the institutional arrangements 
concerning environmental protection should be prioritised. 
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The thesis argues that the environmental information disclosure data reflects the directives of 
the centre because the centre has an institutional advantage and can thus change the behaviour 
of local governments. No policy in the Prevention Plan indicates however that the centre is 
planning to change the current institutional arrangements, in fact, the 2012-2013 data show 
that environmental information disclosure is very low and runs counter to the Prevention Plan. 
The amount of cities that scored points in the disclosure of emission data from key enterprises 
is only 12.7% and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) information, is 5%. 
Therefore, since the EIA is dependent on environmental information and the EPBs are in turn 
dependent on the EIA as an enforcement tool, the Prevention Plan has failed to prevent and 
control air pollution locally. At the same time, these measures show that the centre is indeed 
centralizing power of environmental protection for two reasons, firstly, the low environmental 
information disclosure rate shows that the centre do not want to change the current 
institutional arrangements. Secondly, the emphasis on EIA in the Prevention Plan shows that 
the centre wants to remove local government‟s interference in the local EPB procedures.  
Furthermore, because the consequence of not meeting the air quality standards, results in less 
autonomy on environmental policy-making, the thesis argues that these are further measures 
to centralize power on environmental protection, by indirectly making it difficult for local 
governments to meet the standards; in combination with lack of incentives and constraints on 
local officials. 
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7. Conclusion 
The main research question of the thesis was to answer; how have environmental policy 
affected central-local relations in China? Thus, the purpose of the thesis has been to showcase 
the connection between environmental issues and central-local relations in contemporary 
China. However it developed into something more, where the Prevention Plan has some 
distinct features that clearly show the intentions of the centre, such as local government loss 
of autonomy on environmental policy. Thus adding an additional research question; why does 
the Prevention Plan ignore compliance by local officials in implementing environmental 
policy on the local government level? 
By using the central-local relations theory and de facto federalism, the thesis has been able to 
identify theoretically the reasons behind the measures of the Prevention Plan, mainly the 
intention of moving environmental policy from the bargaining zone to the centrally dictated 
zone. Hence, the thesis has shown that the centre wants to improve local implementation of 
environmental policy without changing the institutional arrangements that has boosted 
economic growth in China in the past. Therefore, the centre has chosen to centralize 
environmental policy entirely and remove the implementation problem altogether, thus 
changing the formal structure of the Chinese system while leaving the behavioural level 
intact.  
However, further study from the perspective of Heilmann (2008) is needed. It is possible that 
centralization and decentralization is occurring frequently, instead of the most common notion 
that there has been decentralization since the 1980s. Thus, the measures of the Prevention 
Plan do not have to mean anything other than that there is a multilevel interaction between 
different levels of government and stakeholders. 
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9. Appendix 
2011-2012 PITI Data 
Top down approach 
Provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei) 
Jing-Jin-Ji    Rank 2011 Rank 2012   
1. Beijing (P)  7  6 + 1 
2. Tianjin (P)  34  23 + 11  
3. Baoding  36  79 - 43 
4. Shijiazhuang  27  37 - 10 
5. Handan   65  54 + 11 
6. Qinhuangdao  88  88 / 0 
7. Tangshan  64  62 + 2 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Chengde, Hengshui, Langfang, Xingtai, Zhangjiakou) 
Provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang) 
Yangtze River Delta  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Shanghai (P)  11  14 - 3 
2. Nanjing   15  15 / 0 
3. Hangzhou  18  8 + 10 
4. Suzhou   19  18 + 1 
5. Ningbo   1  1 / 0 
6. Wuxi   17  22 - 5 
7. Nantong   14  17 - 3 
8. Shaoxing  32  43 - 11 
9. Jiaxing   35  13 + 22 
10. Taizhou   5  21 - 16 
11. Yangzhou  38  5 + 33 
12. Yancheng  45  51 - 6 
13. Huzhou   46  39 + 7 
14. Lianyungang  79  49 + 30 
15. Xuzhou   63  47 + 16 
16. Wenzhou  8  10 - 2 
17. Changzhou  3  20 - 17 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Jinhua, Huaián, Zhoushan, Quzhou, Suqian and Lishui) 
Provinces (Gansu and Ningxia) 
Ganning   Rank 2011 Rank  2012  
1. Lanzhou  67  97 - 30 
2. Yinchuan  29  58 - 29 
 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Baiyin) 
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Provinces (Sichuan, Chongqing) 
Chengdu-Chongqing  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Chongqing   13  9 + 4 
2. Chengdu  59  42 + 17 
3. Luzhou   69  74 - 5 
4. Mianyang  111  36 + 75 
5. Yibin   106  103 + 3 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Zigong, Deyang, Suining, Neijiang, Leshan, Nanchong, Meishan, Guang´an, Dazhou, 
Ziyang) 
Bottom up approach 
Provinces (Guangdong) 
Pearl River Delta  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Guangzhou  16  7 + 9 
2. Shenzhen  2  4 - 2 
3. Zhuhai   50  84 - 34 
4. Dongguan  9  2 + 7 
5. Foshan   6  29 - 23 
6. Zhongshan  4  19 - 15 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Jiangmen, Huizhou, Zhaoqing) 
Provinces (Liaoning) 
Central Liaoning  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Shenyang  51  32 + 19 
2. Anshan   48  99 - 51 
3. Benxi   57  45 + 12 
4. Fushun   87  53 + 34 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Yingkou, Liaoyang, Tieling) 
Provinces (Shandong) 
Shandong peninsula  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Jinan   74  61 + 13 
2. Qingdao  10  3 + 7 
3. Jining   92  101 - 9 
4. Rizhao   89  59 + 30 
5. Tai´an   107  98 + 9 
6. Weifang  55  102 - 47 
7. Weihai   41  50 + 9 
8. Yantai   58  35 + 23 
9. Zaozhuang  91  113 - 22 
10. Zibo   70  55 + 15 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Binzhou, Dezhou, Dongying, Heze, Liaocheng, Linyi, Dongying, Laiwu) 
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Provinces (Fujian) 
Western Taiwan Straits  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Xiamen   75  94 - 19 
2. Quanzhou  20  16 + 4 
3. Fuzhou   12  12 / 0 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Zhangzhou, Putian, Sanming, Nanping, Longyan, Ningde) 
Provinces (Hunan) 
Changsha - Zhuzhou – Xiangtan Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Changsha  80  77 + 3 
2. Zhuzhou  85  78 + 7 
3. Xiangtan  49  52 - 3 
 
Provinces (Hubei) 
Wuhan metropolitan region Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Wuhan   23  31 - 8 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Ezhou, Huanggang, Huangshi, Xianning, Xiaogan)  
Provinces (Shanxi) 
Central and Northern Shanxi Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Taiyuan   37  41 - 4 
2. Datong   101  112 - 11 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Shuzhou, Xinzhou) 
Provinces (Shaanxi) 
Central Shaanxi  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Xi´an   73  68 + 5 
2. Tongchuan  60  100 - 40 
3. Baoji   100  56 + 44 
4. Xianyang  86  111 - 25 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Weinan)  
Provinces (Xianjing) 
Urumqi city cluster  Rank 2011 Rank 2012  
1. Urumqi   62  74 - 12 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Changji, Wujiaxu) 
If there is a large change between 2011 and 2012, where no change in the indicators has occurred, 
then the data is of bad quality. Or perhaps the introduction of the Prevention Plan had such a huge 
effect? 
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2012-2013 PITI Data 
Top down approach 
Provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei) 
Jing-Jin-Ji    Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014  
8. Beijing (P)  6  2 + 4 
9. Tianjin (P)  23  21 + 2  
10. Baoding  79  66 + 13 
11. Shijiazhuang  37  42 - 5 
12. Handan   54  48 + 6 
13. Qinhuangdao  88  93 - 5 
14. Tangshan  62  38 + 24 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Chengde, Hengshui, Langfang, Xingtai, Zhangjiakou) 
Provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang) 
Yangtze River Delta  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
18. Shanghai (P)  14  7 + 7 
19. Nanjing   15  8 + 7 
20. Hangzhou  8  6 + 2 
21. Suzhou   18  14 + 4 
22. Ningbo   1  1  / 0 
23. Wuxi   22  15 + 7 
24. Nantong   17  29 - 12 
25. Shaoxing  43  22 + 21 
26. Jiaxing   13  23 - 10 
27. Taizhou   21  11 + 10 
28. Yangzhou  5  10 - 5 
29. Yancheng  51  34 + 17 
30. Huzhou   39  40 - 1 
31. Lianyungang  49  17 + 32 
32. Xuzhou   47  30 + 17 
33. Wenzhou  10  5 + 5 
34. Changzhou  20  9 + 11 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Jinhua, Huaián, Zhoushan, Quzhou, Suqian and Lishui) 
Provinces (Gansu and Ningxia) 
Ganning   Rank  2012 Rank 2013-2014 
3. Lanzhou  97  108 - 11 
4. Yinchuan  58  57 + 1 
 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Baiyin) 
Provinces (Sichuan, Chongqing) 
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Chengdu-Chongqing  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
6. Chongqing   9  95 - 86 
7. Chengdu  42  25 + 17 
8. Luzhou   74  63 + 11 
9. Mianyang  36  65 - 29 
10. Yibin   103  90 + 13 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Zigong, Deyang, Suining, Neijiang, Leshan, Nanchong, Meishan, Guang´an, Dazhou, 
Ziyang) 
Bottom up approach 
Provinces (Guangdong) 
Pearl River Delta  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
7. Guangzhou  7  36 - 29 
8. Shenzhen  4  31 - 27 
9. Zhuhai   84  73 + 11 
10. Dongguan  2  51 - 49 
11. Foshan   29  62 - 33 
12. Zhongshan  19  37 - 18 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Jiangmen, Huizhou, Zhaoqing) 
Provinces (Liaoning) 
Central Liaoning  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
5. Shenyang  32  45 - 13 
6. Anshan   99  102 - 3 
7. Benxi   45  98 - 53 
8. Fushun   53  85 - 32 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Yingkou, Liaoyang, Tieling) 
Provinces (Shandong) 
Shandong peninsula  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
11. Jinan   61  24 + 37 
12. Qingdao  3  3 / 0 
13. Jining   101  50 + 51 
14. Rizhao   59  41 + 18 
15. Tai´an   98  28 + 70 
16. Weifang  102  20 + 82 
17. Weihai   50  44 + 6 
18. Yantai   35  13 + 22 
19. Zaozhuang  113  33 + 80 
20. Zibo   55  35 + 20 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Binzhou, Dezhou, Dongying, Heze, Liaocheng, Linyi, Dongying, Laiwu) 
Provinces (Fujian) 
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Western Taiwan Straits  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
4. Xiamen   94  26 + 68 
5. Quanzhou  16  27 - 11 
6. Fuzhou   12  16 - 4 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Zhangzhou, Putian, Sanming, Nanping, Longyan, Ningde) 
Provinces (Hunan) 
Changsha - Zhuzhou – Xiangtan Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
4. Changsha  77  67 + 10 
5. Zhuzhou  78  80 - 2 
6. Xiangtan  52  52 / 0 
 
Provinces (Hubei) 
Wuhan metropolitan region Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
2. Wuhan   31  32 - 1 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Ezhou, Huanggang, Huangshi, Xianning, Xiaogan)  
Provinces (Shanxi) 
Central and Northern Shanxi Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
3. Taiyuan   41  76 - 35 
4. Datong   112  120 - 8 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Shuzhou, Xinzhou) 
Provinces (Shaanxi) 
Central Shaanxi  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
5. Xi´an   68  53 + 15 
6. Tongchuan  100  97 - 3 
7. Baoji   56  54 + 2 
8. Xianyang  111  81 + 30 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Weinan)  
Provinces (Xianjing) 
Urumqi city cluster  Rank 2012 Rank 2013-2014 
2. Urumqi   74  77 - 3 
The following cities are not included in the PIT index (Changji, Wujiaxu) 
 
 
 
